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An Introduction to Derivative Securities, Financial Markets, and Risk ManagementAdvanced Financial Risk Management, 2nd ed.

 Blog Entries

Kamakura Corporation Named to World Finance 100

July 30, 2014
American International Group Inc. Bonds:
A Reward to Risk Ratio Twice as High as the Median Bond Issue

July 29,2014
AT&T Inc. Bonds: Ten Times the Risk of IBM and Below Average Value

July 22, 2014
International Business Machines: An Updated Bond Market Ranking

July 16, 2014
Transocean Ltd. Bonds: High Risk, Low Return

July 15, 2014
The Walt Disney Company Bonds: Very Low Default Risk at a “No Brand” Price

July 15, 2014
Brazil, Italy, Spain, Credit Default Swaps and the
European Commission Short Sale Ban, 2010-2014

July 14, 2014
Bank of America and MBIA Lead U.S. Bank Credit Default Swap Trading Volume, 2010-2014

July 12, 2014
Banco Santander, S.A. Tops International Bank
Credit Default Swap Trading Volume, 2010 to 2014

July 11, 2014
Forward Fixed Rate Mortgage Yield Jumps 0.06% and Value of Mortgage Servicing Rights Drops This Week

July 10, 2014
J. C. Penney Leads Non-Bank Corporate Credit Default Swap Trading Volume

July 9, 2014
CDS Trading Volume for 1,206 Reference Names
For 207 Weeks Ended June 27, 2014

July 8, 2014
Hewlett-Packard Company Bonds: Default Risk Continues to Drop

July 3, 2014
Forward 1 Month T-Bill Rates Reverse Last Week’s Declines, Plateau Between 3.70% and 3.72% from 2021 to 2024

July 1, 2014
Kraft Foods Group Inc. Bonds: Under-rated, Low Risk and Solid Value

March 19, 2014
Stress Testing and Interest Rate Risk Models: A Multi-Factor Stress Testing Example

March 13, 2014
Stress Testing: A Credit Spread Ranking of 12 U.S. and 12 International Banks



Kamakura Blog


In the mid 1980s at First Interstate, I participated in serious discussions about how the Merton model of risky debt could be used to diversify credit risk. In the early 1990s, I actively marketed default probabilities based on the Merton concept in Japan. I wrote two books advocating the model in the 1990s as well. Now my view of the model has completely changed. This blog explains how and why that came about.

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Much of today’s credit crisis can be blamed on mortgage structures where the lender hoped, but had no reason to believe, that losses would be manageable. This blog talks about what changes are needed in “common practice” default modeling to achieve “best practice” in both the short and long term.

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Last week on July 22 and 23, our blog post focused on the issue of which government rescues should constitute a "failed" firm for default modeling and which should not. The view of most of our clients is that FNMA and FHLMC are clear fails, while the rating agencies and a few clients say they are not. The choice one makes has big implications for the accuracy of default modeling. This post shows why.

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Yesterday's blog post on the need to audit rating agencies' self-assessments on ratings accuracy has provoked a lot of comments.  What do you think should be done in the KRIS version 5.0 credit modeling exercise with respect to FNMA and FHLMC? 

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The U.S. Treasury proposed new regulations on the major rating agencies yesterday, and a chorus of critics have attacked the agencies for inaccuracy of both structured products and corporate ratings over the last two years.  One of my great fears has been the moral hazard that the rating agencies have to exaggerate the accuracy of their historical performance in rating corporate bonds.  Today, those fears were realized.  The U.S. Treasury should require an independent audit of rating agency performance in rating bonds and structured products.  This post explains why.

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