Search My Blog
 About Suresh

Suresh recently assumed the role of Chief Risk Officer and Managing Director, Advisory Services, of Kamakura Corporation where he heads, develops, and provides Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and Basel III software and advisory consulting services to its clients worldwide.

 Contact Us

Kamakura Corporation
2222 Kalakaua Avenue

Suite 1400
Honolulu HI 96815

Phone: 808.791.9888
Fax: 808.791.9898

Americas, Canada
James McKeon
Director of USA Business Solutions
Phone: 215.932.0312

Andrew Zippan
Director, North America (Canada)
Phone: 647.405.0895

Asia, Pacific
Clement Ooi
Managing Director, ASPAC
Phone: +65.6818.6336

Austrailia, New Zealand
Andrew Cowton
Managing Director
Phone: +61.3.9563.6082

Europe, Middle East, Africa
Jim Moloney
Managing Director, EMEA
Phone: +

Visit Us

Linked In Twitter Seeking Alpha
Careers at Kamakura
Technical Business Consultant – ASPAC
Asia Pacific Region

Business Consultant – ASPAC
Asia Pacific Region


Kamakura Risk Manager Data Expert
Europe, North America, Asia & Australia

Client Relationship Managers

North America


 Suresh Sankaran's Blog

Donald R. van Deventer and Suresh Sankaran
April 25, 2016

The International Financial Reporting Standard (“IFRS”) 9 and the Financial Accounting Standard Board’s (“FASB”) Current Expected Credit Loss (“CECL”) model significantly raise the accuracy bar for valuation and credit risk analytics for all organizations who report under their aegis.

Read More »

Sahaviriya Steel, founded in 1990, is not new to defaults. The group was among Thailand's biggest bad debtors during the Asian financial crisis almost two decades ago, and in 1999 recovered from insolvency as part of a 21-billion-baht debt restructuring programme. Siam Commercial Bank was one of the lead lenders at that time.

The company came to control the Teesside steel plant after purchasing it from India's Tata Steel Ltd in 2011. Even at that time, the plant was losing money. The Viriyaprapaikit family's other companies have included property developer Sahaviriya City Plc and a predecessor company to computer distributor SVOA Plc. Both defaulted on their debt during the Asian financial crisis.

Read More »

For long, it was suspected that without access to INTEX or TREPP, it would be next to impossible to model securitized assets. It has been argued that these assets are fungible and therefore not easy to model on a transaction basis in any risk management solution, and the standard modelling techniques outlined take into consideration the links that INTEX or TREPP offer on cashflow pools and waterfalls. The conventional modeling approach to the valuation of securitized assets has taken on a simplistic hue, in that a link to a provider of standard asset-backed security information is enough to provide a valuation framework that would be largely accepted, but this comes at a distinct cost:

Read More »

Traditionally, liquidity has been defined as:

  • A Russian problem;
  • An Asian problem;
  • Someone else’s problem;
  • A broker’s problem;
  • Not something to worry about since it is guaranteed by the Central Bank; or,
  • All of the above.

Even the Bard has commented on liquidity with the rather pithy ‘put money in thy purse’!

The fact is that most of us are in agreement that liquidity is an important risk element but it is also indisputable that we probably spend less time thinking about it than any other risk category. From an enterprise wide risk management point of view, the need for the integration of liquidity, market and credit risk was recognised after the Russian crisis (August 1998) and the “flight to quality" that followed.

Read More »

Liquidity risk led an unremarkable existence up until 2007-8, when suddenly, regulatory hell broke loose on it. From being a risk that no one talked about, it became the most regulated over a period of 4-5 years. What changed?

Every financial institution collapse added to the mystique of liquidity risk; experts opined, ‘alas, that organisation did not have adequate liquidity to foot expenses’, and this added to the furore surrounding the lack of regulation around liquidity risk.

A risk that was measured through prosaic ratios like loans to deposits is now being subject to haircuts, 3-notch downgrades, run on deposits, concentration of funding and so on. How did this come about?

The answer to both questions lies in the fact that there is now a belated acceptance to the fact that the end product of every other risk in the marketplace in financial terms is a lack of liquidity.

Read More »

«previous next»